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1. INTRODUCTION
With the rise of peer production and social media as prominent creators and aggregators of informa-
tion, questions of incentives and motivation are becoming more central. Why do users contribute? How
do they decide where to contribute? There is an emerging consensus that social feedback is a major
factor driving online behavior. Badges are used by venues to incentivize certain behaviors [Anderson
et al. 2013]. Social feedback increases participation on YouTube and Digg [Wu et al. 2009], and on
Wikipedia [Zhu et al. 2013]. It is clear that social feedback influences the decision to act or not act in
many online settings, but its influence on more complex decision making is less certain.
Consider an example: A user posts a comment in a particular online community, receiving comment
replies and a voting score from other users. All else being equal, the user is more likely to visit this
community in the future. How much more likely? What is the exchange rate between positive ratings
and comment replies? If the user gets more comment replies but fewer positive ratings in another
community, how will she divide her efforts between these communities?
We introduce a model of human behavior changes in response to distributed—user-to-user—social
interactions. This model provides explicit quantitative predictions for user behavior. In doing so, it
creates a framework for evaluating the relative importance of different types of social feedback in de-
termining user behavior, a form of inverse reinforcement learning. We evaluate the model’s predictions
on a community selection dataset collected from the social media website reddit.com.
As a model-free motivating example from this dataset, Figure 1 illustrates the effect of a particular
kind of social feedback, comment replies, on the behavior of reddit users. Those who receive more
comment replies in a community (“subreddit”) are more likely to participate in that community in the
future. There is a clear learning effect, with users spending more effort in communities where they
have received more social feedback in the past.
Quantifying the motivating effects of social feedback allows us to predict individual user behavior,
and as a consequence makes predictions for collective behavior. Users give feedback in communities
they choose to participate in, and their choice of community is then influenced by the feedback they
receive. The resulting collective dynamics shape user migrations between online communities.
2. MODELING COMMUNITY SELECTION
Social feedback can increase a user’s propensity to perform an action: it can tip the scales when the
choice is between doing and not doing. What if the choice is more complex? For example, a user visits
reddit.com. Reddit is partitioned into communities, and the user must decide, implicitly or explicitly,
which community to participate in. How does social feedback affect this choice? Given the visit, there
1A more detailed report on the results presented in this extended abstract will appear in the Proceedings of AAMAS 2014, and
is available at http://www.cse.wustl.edu/˜allenlavoie/papers/reddit.pdf
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Fig. 1: Users change behavior in response to social feedback.
In this model-free view, we compute the relative increase in
visit frequency following social feedback (comment replies)
in a community. Users who receive more comment replies
are more likely to visit the community where those replies
occurred in the future, consistent with a learning effect in
response to social feedback.
ALGORITHM 1: Generative model of a user’s be-
havior, based on initial propensities and learning
in response to social feedback. q is a vector of
propensities, q0 a user’s initial propensities, and si
a chosen community. Selection is governed by Hi-
erarchical Dirichlet Process parameters α0 (scalar
concentration parameter) and β (global commu-
nity popularity vector), and by learning parame-
ters φ (recency) and  (exploration). A reward func-
tion R determines the relative importance of so-
cial feedback features received in response to an
action, which are encoded in vector ri (assumed to
be instantaneous for simplicity).
q0 ∼ Dirichlet(α0β) // Initial propensities (HDP)
q ← q0;
for i ∈ Cu do ; // User’s actions (ordered)
si ∼ Categorical(q/
∑
j
qj) ; // Strategy picking
q ← q(1− φ) ; // Recency
qsi ← (1− )R(ri) + qsi ; // Direct reward
q ← q + R(ri)q0 ; // Exploration
end
is an inherent competition between communities for that user’s attention.2 We model this conflict by
analogy to human game playing. A player picks a strategy, and receives some reward based not only
on his own action, but also the actions of other players. Picking a community is equivalent to picking
a strategy, and the resulting social feedback is indicative of a reward.
We begin with the model of Erev and Roth [1998]: users maintain propensities, updated whenever a
reward is received. The model is inherently probabilistic, with users drawing a strategy from a distri-
bution defined by those propensities. With additional considerations for recency and exploration, this
model has been quite successful in explaining and predicting human game playing behavior. However,
the analogy between game playing and community selection is not perfect.
One important consideration is a user’s exogenous interests (hobbies, physical location, etc.), each
more or less popular globally (e.g. more people live in New York than St. Louis). While there are more
online communities than there are strategies in the typical behavioral economics experiment, a more
fundamental difference is that online communities are not finite in number: new communities are
created frequently. The Hierarchical Dirichlet Process [Teh et al. 2006] captures these features: an
infinite space of communities, individual preferences, and global popularities.
How motivating is a particular kind of social feedback? We employ a form of inverse reinforcement
learning [Ng and Russell 2000]. Rather than assuming that an agent acts optimally with respect to
an unknown utility function, we assume that agents learn according to the Erev and Roth model with
rewards having an unknown relationship to social feedback. This learned relationship between social
feedback and numeric reward, which we assume to be linear, is built into the model.
Combining these considerations, Algorithm 1 presents a generative model of user behavior in com-
munity selection. Users draw initial propensities according to the Hierarchical Dirichlet Process, then
2Our analysis assumes the user has decided exogenously to participate or not, e.g. in reddit; this assumption could be relaxed
by modeling a user’s overall participation rate or adding competition with a “life” action [Anderson et al. 2013].
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Fig. 2: Model performance on a probabilistic prediction task
(community selection), as the fraction of each user’s actions
available for training is varied (with a consistent test set).
Static models such as “Initial” (the generative model with
no learning) become bogged down with irrelevant older data;
this decline can be prevented with recency heuristics (e.g.
InitKMax), but is further indication that a dynamic model is
more appropriate. Other baselines are based on a model-free
view of a user’s previous actions (UserAll and UserKMax)
or all users’ actions (Global). The full reinforcement learning
model performs significantly better than these baselines.
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700
Round number
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Fr
ac
tio
n 
of
 to
ta
l p
os
ts
 in
 c
om
m
un
ity
 D
Community seeding outcomes (averaged)
Successful
Late failure
No traction
Fig. 3: Outcomes of community seeding simulations, model-
ing agents with parameters inferred from real data. Normal
users select a community, then provide some feedback within
that community (via voting and commenting). A set of seed
users select and provide feedback only in a particular com-
munity for 200 rounds, their goal being to make that commu-
nity dominant and self-sustaining. Sequences were grouped
based first on the fraction of interest at round 200: no trac-
tion (≤ 0.4) or early traction. Of the latter, there are late
failures (≤ 0.5 at 700) and successfully seeded communities.
Curves are averaged within each group.
make some number of contributions. For each contribution, the user first picks a strategy (i.e. a commu-
nity) by normalizing her propensities. The user then updates her propensities according to the reward
received, which is a linear function of the observed social feedback (in our data, ri is a two-element
vector containing a normalized reply count and voting score). Recency implies that older experiences
are less influential, and exploration prevents a user from converging on a single community. Having
specified a generative model of human behavior, we perform approximate Bayesian inference to learn
the parameters of the model (recency, exploration, the reinforcement function, HDP parameters) and
subsequently make predictions.
3. RESULTS
Figure 2 shows an evaluation of the predictions of the generative model on our reddit community
selection dataset, containing 174783 submissions and comments by 1696 users. For each submission
or comment, we collected its voting score and any replies in order to compute social feedback features.
These predictions are probabilistic, evaluated with the quadratic scoring rule on observed outcomes.
Our model performs significantly better than several plausible baselines.
We now turn to simulations of collective dynamics. How does a new social media site start? Without
users, there is no content, and without content a site is not attractive to new users. Reddit itself
famously began by presenting fake content posted by fake users [Morris 2012], but quickly became
self-sustaining. Is a similar feat possible with social feedback? Figure 3 presents simulations in which
a new community, initially very small, attracts new users by providing manufactured social feedback
for a short period. Under the model of individual behavior we infer from real data, it is possible to
induce a herding effect toward a new community with the concerted effort of a small number of users.
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